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Abstract
Institutional arrangements used to steer public policies have increasingly become
layered. Inspired by the literature on institutional layering and institutional work, this
paper aims to make a contribution to our understanding of institutional layering. We do
so by studying an interesting case of layering: the Dutch hospital sector. We focus on
the actors responsible for the internal governance (Board of Directors and Supervisory
Boards) and the external regulation (the Healthcare Inspectorate) of hospitals. In the
paper, we explore the institutional work of these actors, more specifically how institu-
tional work results from and is influenced by institutional layering and how this in turn
influences the institutional makeup of both healthcare organizations and their institu-
tional context. Our approach allowed us to see that layering changes the activities of
actors in the public sector, can be used to strengthen one’s position but also presents
actors with new struggles, which they in turn can try to overcome by relating and using
the institutionally layered context. Layering and institutional work are therefore in
continuous interaction. Combining institutional layering with a focus on the lived
experiences of actors and their institutional work makes it possible to move into the
layered arrangement and better understand its consequences.
Keywords
Healthcare, institutional layering, institutional work, public administration, public
management, regulation
Corresponding author:
Hester M van de Bovenkamp, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Institute of Health Policy and Management,
Postbus 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Email: vandebovenkamp@bmg.eur.nl
Introduction
Institutional contexts in the public sector have become increasingly complex as they are
built on diﬀerent institutional arrangements that exist at the same time. For example,
the introduction of regulated markets and other New Public Management (NPM)-like
interventions were not accompanied by the elimination of other institutional arrange-
ments such as professional self-regulation and consensus building between stake-
holders. Instead, these preexisting arrangements have become incorporated in
and conditioned by regulated markets. Therefore, the introduction of regulated mar-
kets in Western European countries meant that increasingly complicated mixed
arrangements to govern public policies were created (Streeck and Thelen, 2005),
which public service providers have to relate to. In this paper, we explore what this
means for actors working in these organizations, how they respond to these layered
arrangements, and how they in turn inﬂuence this institutional context. For this
exploration, we draw on the concepts of institutional layering and institutional work.
The concept of institutional layering has been introduced to better understand
complex arrangements and how they came about (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010;
Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Institutional layering is a type of institutional change
in which new institutions are added on top of or alongside existing ones.
Institutional layering does not mean that new arrangements simply overlie others
but that arrangements interact with each other, which can lead to large and unpre-
dictable transformations (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).
These transformations can have important consequences for actors working in
such a layered arrangement. Much literature on layering describes the historical
process of layering and focuses on its consequences on policies and the actions of
actors at the macro level (e.g. Beland, 2007; Parker and Parenta, 2008; Thatcher
and Coen, 2008). However, in this article we take a somewhat diﬀerent focus.
Instead of researching the process of layering, we take layered institutional envir-
onments as our starting point and explore the undertheorized issue of how actors
working in organizations that have to relate to such an institutionally layered
context engage with this context.
The literature on layering acknowledges the important role actors play as change
agents who strategically wish to bring about institutional change (Hacker, 2004;
Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Scheingate, 2010). In this article, we extend this actor
approach by introducing the concept of institutional work from the Organization
Sciences. This literature took a similar actor-focused turn as its Public
Administration counterpart, by focusing on the work of actors that actively shape
institutions (Currie et al., 2012; Lawrence et al., 2011). However, institutional work
does not only comprise the strategic use of the institutional context in order to bring
about certain changes, as is the focus in Public Administration literature, but also the
daily coping and keeping up with institutional structures (Lawrence et al., 2011). Such
daily work, as is shown for example in literature on organizational routines, both
works to sustain and change prevailing institutional structures (Feldman and
Pentland, 2003). Using the concept of institutional work in our study on institutional
layering allows us to better understand the dynamics caused by institutional layering.
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The Dutch hospital sector is an interesting case of layering and is used in this
paper as our case study (Van de Bovenkamp et al., 2014). We focus on the actors
responsible for the internal governance (Board of Directors and Supervisory
Boards) and the external regulation (the Healthcare Inspectorate) of Dutch hos-
pitals. Increasingly, these actors were given responsibility for quality of care as a
consequence of institutional layering. In the paper we focus on the institutional
work of these actors, more speciﬁcally on how institutional work results from and
is inﬂuenced by institutional layering and how this in turn inﬂuences the institu-
tional makeup of both healthcare organizations and their institutional context.
We answer the following research questions: How does institutional layering inﬂu-
ence the institutional work of actors responsible for the internal governance and
external regulation of quality of care of Dutch hospitals and how does this institu-
tional work lead to institutional change both within and outside these organizations?
In the following, we ﬁrst elaborate on the literature on institutional layering and
institutional work. Then, we describe the institutionally layered context of Dutch
healthcare quality governance and regulation and the methods used to study our
case. Thereafter, we present the results in terms of how the actors responsible for
the internal governance and external regulation respond and relate to institutional
layering through institutional work. We conclude with a reﬂection on the added
value of combining the concepts of institutional layering and institutional work.
Institutional layering and institutional work
Incremental change can count on growing attention of Public Administration
scholars working in the ﬁeld of institutional theory (Hacker, 2004; Mahoney and
Thelen, 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004; Van der Heijden, 2010).
This strand of literature argues that institutions are not static and do not only
change through exogenous shocks as punctuated equilibrium theory proposes, but
incrementally change and evolve due to both exogenous and endogenous sources of
change. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) identify four types of incremental change:
displacement (the removal of existing institutions and the introduction of new
ones), drift (the changed impact of existing institutions due to shifts in the envir-
onment), conversion (the changed enactment of existing institutions due to their
strategic deployment), and layering (the introduction of new institutions on top of
or alongside existing ones). It is the latter we focus on in this paper.
As the expanding literature that uses concepts drawn from the incremental change
framework shows (e.g. Beland, 2007; Carboni, 2010; Horton, 2006; Parker and
Parenta, 2008; Scheingate, 2010; Thatcher and Coen, 2008; Wallenburg et al.,
2012), the framework provides us with language and tools to describe how and
why a certain mode of change occurred. Aside from this, we argue that it can also
provide insight into what this change means (Van der Heijden, 2010). It is this we
focus on in this article; we argue that the concept of layering can be used to better
understand policy reforms, the complex institutional arrangements they create, their
consequences, and the way actors deal with these consequences. Therefore, in this
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article we do not focus on the process of layering but on how actors relate to a
layered institutional arrangement. In order to do this, we ﬁrst need to be clear about
our use of the layering concept.
In his review on layering, Van der Heijden (2011) shows that the concept is used
in terms of actors being added, in terms of instruments added, and in terms of
adding both instruments and actors. In this paper, we follow this broader use by
focusing on the layering of institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements
consist of both instruments and actors. Moreover, this broad approach allows for
the recognition of the diﬀerent institutional logics that can exist at the same time in
a layered arrangement.
Typologies of institutional arrangements are a useful heuristic device to under-
stand institutional layering (e.g. Helderman, 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).
Table 1 is an example of such a typology. It builds on a distinction between four
institutional arrangements (state, market, civil society, and professional community)
coupled with the governing mechanisms that are dominant within these arrange-
ments (regulation, contracts, consultation, and self-regulation). The ideal types can
be separated based on (1) the extent the state has a dominant position and is able to
inﬂuence decision-making and (2) the room private and societal actors have to regu-
late themselves. Based on these axes, the typology separates four institutional
arrangements, which diﬀer in terms of who is able to play a key role, how deci-
sion-making is organized, and how decisions are implemented. The beneﬁt of this
typology is that it emphasizes the diﬀerent governance mechanisms and the institu-
tional logics behind them. Together with the concept of institutional layering, it can
help us understand complex institutional arrangements better. Layering in this paper
therefore refers to the layering of institutional arrangements.
An important feature of the incremental change literature is the active role
attributed to actors who can inﬂuence institutional change (Hacker, 2004;
Mahony and Thelen, 2010; Scheingate, 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Since
rules allow room for interpretation, debate, and contestation, actors can operate
strategically in their institutional environment, acting as change agents who can set
in motion incremental change (Hacker, 2004; Mahony and Thelen, 2010;
Scheingate, 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). However, actors are confronted
with the consequences of layering in their day-to-day activities as well. To better
understand these consequences and how actors deal with those, we therefore want
Table 1. Ideal typical institutional arrangements (based on Bal (2008) and Helderman (2007))
Level of self-regulation of collective actors
Low High
Level of state intervention High State and hierarchy
Regulation
Civil society/association
(neo-corporatist) Consultation
Low Market
Contract
Professional community
Self-regulation
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to extent this actor approach by not only focusing on actors as change agents but
also on their day-to-day interactions with layering.
The concept of institutional work, borrowed from the Organization Sciences is of
added value here. The concept was introduced by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) who
recognized a similar actor focused turn in institutional theory in the Organization
Sciences. Although the inﬂuence of actors on institutions has long been recognized in
this ﬁeld (e.g. Selznick, 1957), here institutional theory mostly focused on the way
institutions govern action. However, since the seminal works of DiMaggio (1988) on
institutional entrepreneurship and Oliver (1991) on strategic responses of organiza-
tions to institutional contexts, there has been a steady development in literature
focusing on the role of actors in creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). By contributing agency to actors when studying
institutions and institutional change, insights from institutional and political models
are combined (DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Institutional work
includes the strategic use discussed in the incremental change literature described
above. However, this work does not only comprise the strategic use of the institu-
tional context in order to bring about certain changes, but also the everyday getting
by; actors cope with, keep up with, shore up, tear down, tinker with, transform or
create new institutional structures, which can create, maintain, or disrupt institutions
(Lawrence et al., 2011). This way a broad vision of agency is used; avoiding seeing
actors as cultural dopes who are trapped by institutional arrangements but also of
depicting them as highly inﬂuential institutional entrepreneurs (Lawrence et al., 2009).
This institutional work is enacted by individuals and groups who can reproduce the
roles assigned to them by their institutional context but can also challenge, modify,
and disrupt these roles (Lawrence et al., 2011). It is therefore important to study how
actors respond to layering empirically. It is this working approach to institutional
layering that allows us to move into the layered institutional arrangement and thereby
understand its consequences for daily practices.
Setting the scene: Institutional layering in Dutch healthcare
The layered institutional arrangement of Dutch hospital care causes many actors to
be involved in quality of care and diﬀerent steering mechanisms drawing from
diﬀerent institutional logics to be used (van de Bovenkamp et al., 2014). Table 2
depicts this layered institutional arrangement, based on the four ideal types of
institutional arrangements identiﬁed above (Table 1). In the following, we will
shortly describe how this layered arrangement came about and show how diﬀerent
institutional arrangements have been added while previously introduced arrange-
ments continue to exist.
Short history of institutional layering in healthcare governance
Originally, quality of care was based on self-regulation by the professional commu-
nity, drawing on instruments such as medical education, peer review, clinical
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guidelines, visitation, etc. (Klazinga, 1996), complemented with a limited amount
of state regulation, e.g. regarding academic training and the supervision of quality
of care. The role of the state however was mainly to protect the boundaries of the
medical sphere.
During the mid-1980s, a public discussion started on quality of care as part of
the debate on getting a grip on rising healthcare costs. From the end of the 1980s
onward, the associational arrangement in which consultation with societal actors
involved in healthcare—professionals, healthcare providers, patient organizations,
insurers, and government—played an imported role in bringing about change
(Bal, 2008). This resulted in the implementation of several legal arrangements,
such as the Individual Healthcare Professionals Act (1997) and the Quality of
care Act (1996) which aimed to regulate quality of care.
Table 2. Layered institutional arrangement of Dutch healthcare
Institutional
arrangement Important actors Steering instruments Period
Market Insurers, health care
providers, patients
Competition, closing
contracts, transparency
Officially introduced
as the dominant
arrangement
in 2006, after an
incremental change
process
State and
hierarchy
Ministry of Health,
Healthcare Inspectorate
Top-down regulation
through legislation
(e.g. Quality of care act,
Individual Healthcare
Professions Act) and
supervision
Always played a role,
importance increased
from the 2000s onward
and especially after the
implementation of
the market-based system
Civil society/
association
Healthcare professionals,
providers, insurers,
patient organizations,
government
Consultation and
deliberation,
e.g. in setting
performance indicators.
Was important in the
development of the
Quality of Care Act in
the 1990s. And again
in setting limits
on economic growth
of the healthcare sector
in 2012
Especially important
in the 1990s,
still plays a role
but less dominant
then before
Professional
community
Healthcare
professionals
Medical training,
peer review,
guidelines, visitation,
quality systems
Oldest, still highly
important but
less dominant
than before
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Toward the beginning of the 2000s, it was concluded that the implementation of
this legislation was inadequate (Casparie et al., 2001) which resulted in more state
regulation of quality through the Inspectorate. This happened alongside the imple-
mentation of the market-based system, which was introduced in 2006 as the oﬃcial
governance arrangement. Within this system, all Dutch citizens are obliged to buy
private health insurance. The idea is that the parties in healthcare (providers,
insurers, and patients) regulate healthcare through competition and closing
contracts on three markets. In the healthcare provision market, hospitals (mostly
private not for proﬁt) compete for patients. In the healthcare insurance market,
insurers compete for the insured. Both healthcare providers and insurers are active
in the healthcare purchasing market. Here, insurers can buy care selectively on the
basis of quality and price. Transparency of healthcare quality is seen as a crucial
instrument for the market to work, since quality information is needed by patients,
insurers, and providers alike.
So throughout the years, the Dutch healthcare system became increasingly
layered. With the introduction of the market-based system it draws from all four
of the governance arrangements described above (see Tables 1 and 2).
Interaction between layers
The diﬀerent layers in the Dutch healthcare system do not just exist alongside
each other; they interact. The introduction of the market did not result in the elim-
ination of other institutional arrangements. These preexisting arrangements—
professional communities, the state, and civil society—became incorporated in, were
conditioned, or even strengthened by the new healthcare system (Van de Bovenkamp
et al., 2014). For instance, the professional community still plays an important role
through the mechanism of self-regulation based on professional norms, which are set
by professional associations. However, these norms partly take on a diﬀerent meaning
because departing from them becomes more diﬃcult as actors such as the Inspectorate
and insurers turn to them for regulatory grip. In terms of Mahoney and Thelen’s
framework (2010), layering therefore also resulted in institutional drift, since the
impact of guidelines changed as a result of shifts in the environment.
Elements of a civil society arrangement and the mechanism of consultation can
also still be identiﬁed. For instance, insurers, healthcare providers, and the gov-
ernment reached an agreement after a consultation process aimed at reducing the
rise in healthcare costs through consultation (NVZ et al., 2011) and civil society
actors consult on setting performance indicators.
Interestingly, rather than being opposites the market and the state have proven
to be mutually reinforcing institutions; the transparency of healthcare quality
accompanying the market-based system also renewed emphasis on top-down steer-
ing. Examples of this include giving the healthcare inspectorate a more dominant
role, setting up national quality and safety programs, and setting up a national
quality institute in order to gain control over quality instruments (Van de
Bovenkamp et al., 2014).
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Consequences for the internal governance and the external regulation
of hospitals
Layering has caused many actors to be involved in governing quality of care.
They all use their own instruments and draw from diﬀerent logics to try to get a
grip on and steer quality of care. By consequence, hospitals ﬁnd themselves in an
increasingly fragmented institutional context, which makes them an interesting
subject of study (Van de Bovenkamp et al., 2014). Although many actors are
now involved in governing quality, the actors responsible for the internal govern-
ance (Board of Directors and Supervisory Boards) and the external regulation (the
Healthcare Inspectorate) of hospitals have increasingly been given responsibility
for quality of care. The process of layering also impacted the role of these actors in
important ways. For example, the introduction of the Quality of Care Act in 1996
obligated healthcare organizations to have a quality system in place and gave
Boards of Directors the ﬁnal responsibility for quality in their hospital
(Legemaate et al., 2013). The introduction of the Quality of Care act therefore
aﬀected the internal governance of quality of care since it transferred responsibil-
ities within hospitals from professionals to the Board of Directors of healthcare
organizations. The Healthcare Inspectorate, as the external state regulator of qual-
ity of care, was meant to supervise whether this responsibility was taken up in
practice. At the same time, these actors have to relate to the self-regulation of
professionals and participate in consultations in the civil society arrangement.
Moreover, the introduction of the market-based system meant that Boards of
Directors have to negotiate contracts with insurers, whilst at the same time having
to relate to quality demands of professional bodies, patient organizations, etc.
Because of the central role of Boards of Directors, Supervisory Boards, and
Inspectorate, in the layered governance arrangement they will be the focus of
our study. In the rest of the paper, we further explore their institutional work,
how this work results from and is inﬂuenced by institutional layering, and how this
in turn can spur further institutional change.
Methods
A qualitative research design was used to conduct this study. First, interviews were
conducted with actors (n¼ 18) who have played or play a role in the internal
governance and the external regulation of the quality of care in Dutch hospitals:
directors of hospitals (n¼ 5, some of them were also healthcare professionals),
a quality manager (n¼ 1), a representative of the association for healthcare
directors (n¼ 1), and a representative of the association for internal healthcare regu-
lators (n¼ 1). Next to these, (former) inspectors of the Healthcare Inspectorate
(n¼ 5) and policy makers of the Ministry of Health (n¼ 2) were interviewed. In
addition, we interviewed governance experts and senior advisors (n¼ 3, one of them
a former inspector), who were key players in the development of governance of
hospitals in the last 20–30 odd years. All respondents operate from a profound
and “experienced” understanding of the governance of quality in hospital care.
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We tried to keep the conversations as open as possible, yet beforehand
we distinguished four topics that we wanted to discuss during the interviews:
(1) the meaning given to the governance of quality in hospitals throughout the
years, especially focusing on the years building up to and after the introduction of
the market-based system, (2) the background of the discussion on governance,
(3) the role division of actors involved in healthcare quality and the instruments
used by these actors to steer quality of care, and (4) views on, experiences with and
responses to the interactions between actors within the diﬀerent institutional
arrangements. The ﬁrst two authors undertook all the interviews. The interviews
lasted between 60 and 90min and were conducted in the respondents’ own envir-
onment in an open “conversational” way—known as narrative interviewing
(Czarniawska, 1998). The interviews were recorded, after ﬁrst seeking the respond-
ent’s consent, and transcribed verbatim.
Second, we collected and analyzed policy documents on the topic of healthcare
governance from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports; reports from
the Healthcare Inspectorate; evaluations of quality legislation and reports of the
Dutch Safety Board that according to our respondents had a great inﬂuence in
transforming the regulation of the quality of hospital care. In addition, we analyzed
empirical studies (research reports, academic articles) on the governance of health-
care quality in the Netherlands.
Data analysis was a combination of induction and deduction. First, we coded
our data inductively, which eventually led to the following four key codes: (1) the
roles and responsibilities of actors in healthcare quality (e.g. who is responsible for
quality of care, in what way and how do these responsibilities relate to each other),
(2) the meaning of governance (e.g. what do actors mean when they talk about
governance and what does this subsequently mean for the role division and activ-
ities of actors both within the hospital and its external environment, (3) the instru-
ments to steer quality (e.g. what instruments do actors use to steer quality and how
do they relate to each other), and (4) interactions between institutional arrange-
ments (e.g. how do actors, steering mechanisms, and institutional logics interact).
We then iteratively compared these “grounded” codes deductively with the theor-
etical concepts: governance of quality, institutional layering, and institutional
work. The typology of institutional arrangements (Table 1) served as a theoretical
framework for the deductive part of the analysis.
Results
In this section we show how layering has put the internal governance of quality
of care on the agenda and how the actors, Boards of Directors, Supervisory
Boards, and Inspectorate, engaged in institutional work, which enabled them
to strengthen their position while at the same time confronting them with new
problems in gaining control eﬀectively. At the end of this section, we describe
how these actors respond to these problems and how this in turn leads to institu-
tional change.
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Becoming active as a result of layering
The introduction of themarket-based systemwas accompanied by an increased focus
on transparency (Bal and Zuiderent-Jerak, 2011). In order for the market-based
system to work and for actors to play their designated role, information about qual-
ity of care is seen as “absolutely essential” by the Ministry of Health (Schippers,
2011a, 2011b). As a result of this transparency the fact that mistakes are made and
things can and do go wrong becomes broadly known as well (Klink, 2009). This
resulted in extensive media attention in several major incidents. Our respondents
emphasize the important role this transparency and the resulting media attention for
quality incidents played in getting the subject of governance of quality on the agenda.
The responsibility for the content of care was completely assigned to professionals for
which they did not have to be accountable. This was changed legally with the introduction
of the Quality of Care Act in 1996. The Boards of Directors legally carry the ﬁnal
responsibility for everything in the organization. That includes the quality and safety of
the care process. That has been duly noted for a long time. Nothing happened with that.
Until, and that is the ﬁrst time this was exposed, the Radboud case [case concerning high
mortality rates on a cardiology ward]. (governance expert and former chief inspector)
Other incidents concerning failing quality of care, which were also broadly dis-
cussed in the public and political arena, followed (Behr et al., 2015). Respondents
note that this media attention urged Boards of Directors to get more grip on the
subject of quality and thereby on the healthcare professionals working in their
hospital. Attention for the governance of hospitals also increased because of the
analysis of these incidents made by government regulatory bodies—the Healthcare
Inspectorate and the Dutch Safety Board—in terms of failing governance (OvV,
2008, 2011, 2014). The Healthcare Inspectorate concluded that these incidents did
not stand-alone but that a lack of responsibilities of the internal governance con-
cerning quality of care was a structural problem (IGZ, 2009). In response to these
cases, the Ministry of Health emphasized the role and responsibility of the
Supervisory Boards and the “indisputable end responsibility” of the Board of
Directors (Klink, 2009; Schippers and Van Rijn, 2013). Moreover, in the
Radboud and follow-up cases, both the Board of Directors and Supervisory
boards were “forced” to step down or change.
As a consequence of this increased external public and political attention for the
internal governance of quality, respondents point out that a shift can be seen in prac-
tice; Boards of Directors and Supervisory Boards have put quality ﬁrmly on their
agenda. This feeling of urgency is generally felt by Boards of Directors and not only
present in hospitals where quality incidents that received media attention occurred.
And this transparency, with the paradox that is accompanied by it of course, has set a lot
in motion. That goes for the Board of Directors and that goes for the Supervisory
Boards. Supervisory Boards cannot hide in the attic anymore. Everything is transparent.
(Healthcare Inspector)
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As a result of this transparency, attention was also directed at the state regulator
responsible for the supervision of quality of care: the Healthcare Inspectorate.
Thereby, the importance of top-down state regulation was emphasized and strength-
ened as well. The Inspectorate was criticized for not supervising the governance
of hospitals enough (OvV, 2008). In response to this, also the Inspectorate has
put governance on its agenda. It has appointed priority status to the question
if the Board of Directors together with professionals and Supervisory Boards
are “in control” (IGZ, 2009). Moreover, it made supervision of the responsibility
of the Board of Directors for quality and safety part of its regular supervision
(IGZ, 2011).
So although the Board of Directors was assigned the legal responsibility for
ensuring quality of care already in the mid-1990s and, by consequence, the respon-
sibility of internal and external regulators to supervise if they had taken up this
responsibility, this was put into practice only much later. The layered institutional
arrangement of quality of care seems to have served as an impetus for these actors
to take up their role. Only in the mid-2000s, when transparency had become a
dominant value in the market-based system, were the agreements made under
the institutional arrangement of the associational order implemented. Moreover,
top-down state supervision of the implementation of this act was developed during
that period. The introduction of the market-based system therefore served as a
means to hold actors accountable for their designated role alongside a strengthen-
ing of state actors. As a result these actors indeed took up their role, thereby
contributing to, in terms of Lawrence and Suddaby, the creation of their role
regarding quality of care (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). We explore how they
did this further in the next paragraph.
Using layers to gain control over quality
Above we saw how institutional layering inﬂuenced Boards of Directors,
Supervisory Boards, and the Inspectorate to take up their role, thereby showing
the inﬂuence of the institutional context on actors. Here, we focus on their insti-
tutional work to gain control over quality and how they use the layered institu-
tional context in this work, thereby changing their institutional position within the
hospital (Boards of Directors, Supervisory Boards) and in relation to the hospital
(Healthcare Inspectorate). This analysis therefore shows how actors’ activities in
turn shape institutions (Lawrence et al., 2009).
The governance of hospitals is mostly talked about in terms of trying to get
clarity about the responsibilities of actors and relationships between those actors
regarding the subject of quality of care. Despite the myriad of actors involved in
quality of care as a result of layering, a clear division of responsibility is sought for.
Respondents translate being responsible into the question whether the Board of
Directors is “in control” of quality and safety within the hospital. The Supervisory
Board needs to check whether this is indeed the case. The Healthcare Inspectorate
in turn needs to supervise whether this internal governance system works. So,
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increasingly, Boards of Directors are attributed an important role in ensuring the
quality of care, which strengthens their position vis-a`-vis healthcare professionals, a
relationship which can be a continuous struggle.
If the relationship [between Board of Directors and medical professionals] is bad, then
the medical staﬀ will say to the director: quality in the consultation room is our thing. [I]
agree when this concerns the one-on-one contact with the patient. [I] disagree when this
concerns what happens next. I don’t need to know what happens in the consultation room
but I do need to know how the individual specialist and his group of specialists work on
quality and how they ensure the quality provided in that consultation room. (Former
hospital director and former inspector)
Boards of Directors perform institutional work to get this grip on professionals, for
which they draw on the institutionally layered context. An important instrument
they use for gaining control is building quality systems. Due to the layered insti-
tutional arrangement, there is a lot of information available that can serve as input
for these systems. Market parties such as insurers and patient organizations have
their indicators and rankings. The professional community has its visitations,
audits, and guidelines. And the state regulator has its own indicators and supervi-
sion reports. This myriad of information is used by Boards of Directors to play
their role, thus using the layered quality structure as a means to further their end.
For example, Bal et al. (2015) have shown how hospital rankings, part of
the market-based system, can be used internally as a strategic tool to weaken
traditional hierarchies and the powerful position of medical professionals. The
information that quality instruments provide can thus be used to steer quality
and give Boards of Directors the means to get a grip on healthcare professionals
and to deal with quality problems that might arise.
Throughout the years you step in earlier, you can nip it in the bud. That helps. Because
there is more information, we now at least have the HSMR [Hospital Standardized
Mortality Rate], well we did not have those eight years ago. (hospital director)
While there is also ﬁerce criticism toward such quality instruments as the HSMR
(Etzioni, 2014) hospital administrators actually use such instruments in their institu-
tional work vis-a`-vis professionals. In a similar way, performance indicators, stand-
ards, and management tools also give the external regulator the information needed
to supervise the governance of healthcare organizations. It uses this information to
take up its own role and in turn strengthen its position vis-a`-vis Boards of Directors.
At the same time Boards of Directors sometimes use the Inspectorate to get a grip on
their professionals, thereby calling upon state regulation to get things done.
They had a big ﬁght with the internists and the intensive care specialists and they did not
manage to solve that, so then the Inspectorate had to say ‘boo’. That is what they did and
then you have them at your side. (quality consultant 3)
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We can conclude from the above that working in a layered institutional arrange-
ment enables the Board of Directors to gain some control over quality of care and
healthcare professionals by providing quality information. In a similar way, it
enables the Supervisory Board and the Inspectorate to check if the Board of
Directors is “in control.” Instruments from diﬀerent institutional layers thus
seem to play a role in governing quality of care. However, the layered institutional
arrangement also poses challenges to the governance of quality.
Struggling with layers
Above we saw how layering is used by actors in their institutional work to take up
their role. However, layering can also blur responsibilities and have a burdening
eﬀect (Van der Heijden, 2011). This can also be seen in our case; actors are strug-
gling with layers. They may use layering to strengthen their role within their organ-
ization or in relation to each other. At the same time it causes problems in their
relation with external actors and as a result in the way they are forced to take up
their role.
Working in a layered institutional arrangement means having to relate to many
external actors, mostly by giving account of one’s actions. The transparency
accompanying the market-based system not only served as a window for the inter-
nal governance and external regulator of hospitals to strengthen their role, but it
also gives external actors the means to gain control over the internal governance of
hospitals and the external regulation thereof. The result of this can best be
described as a struggle between having to relate to external parties that are
active in the diﬀerent layers and at the same time to be in control over the quality
of care in the hospital.
In the layered arrangement, market parties are attributed an important role in
holding hospitals to account for quality of care (Klink, 2009; Schippers, 2011b).
Patients should critically choose their provider and insurers should buy their care
selectively. As we have noted above, in order to do so hospitals have to provide
these actors with a lot of quality information. So far however, patients use quality
information to choose their provider to a very limited extent (Van de Bovenkamp
et al., 2013). Insurers, who do ask for quality information from the hospitals,
hardly use that data either: respondents feel that in practice insurers do not steer
on quality but on price (see also Zuiderent-Jerak et al., 2010):
They poor out this bureaucracy all over you and you have to comply with that. So that
keeps your organization busy. And subsequently the health care purchaser [insurer]
comes by and you just talk about money. (Hospital director)
So although respondents note that relating to market parties takes up much time,
the added value for their quest for control over quality is not always clear. Due to
layering however, the market is not the only arrangement Boards of Directors have
to relate to. The state continues to play an important role through top-down
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steering. For example, the Ministry of Health inﬂuences quality of care policies
through legislation and the creation of new institutions to be involved in quality of
care, which causes further fragmentation.
We have to deal with insane legislation, a completely instable government policy and an
enormous amount of organizations that have an opinion. (Governance expert)
Government especially falls back on top-down steering when quality incidents
occur that ﬁgure prominently in the media as a result of the increased transparency
of healthcare. A dominant government response to these incidents is to step in and
steer quality top-down by giving the Inspectorate incident-based assignments. This
causes problems for Boards of Directors and Healthcare Inspectorate alike accord-
ing to respondents since it becomes diﬃcult to improve quality in a structural way.
The Inspectorate also struggles with the fact that the Ministry of Health regularly
falls back on top-down ad hoc steering. It is felt that the Ministry’s response to
these incidents attributes too much responsibility to the Inspectorate:
The biggest problem is the enormous pressure of the media and politics: if something goes
wrong the Inspectorate failed. (Inspector IGZ)
Not only the amount of actors involved and the myriad of instruments are con-
sidered problematic, the nature of the instruments used, also pose the internal
governance and the Inspectorate for problems. As we saw in the previous section,
these instruments on the one hand give Boards of Directors and supervisors the
tools to get more control over quality. On the other hand, respondents point out
that relying on information provided by formal systems is not enough. Informal
activities are just as important in order to gain control. Examples of this include
talking to staﬀ in an informal way, visiting wards, using your gut feeling and
understanding the culture in the hospital.
I have a kind of adage that the moment you make a decision, you have to do that
according to the formal rules (. . .) but especially the preparation of such a decision
has to be done as informal as possible, because you don’t hear what is really going on in
the meetings and you have to get a feeling about the expected eﬀect and that can only be
done (. . .) in an informal way. (Member of Board of Directors hospital)
One of the respondents of the Inspectorate told us that getting in touch with the
informal and cultural “eco-system” is just as important as having insight in the
indicators and in the ﬁnancial situation of an organization:
You cannot use checklists for the informal things, these are too soft. There is a lot of
‘soft’ information to check. That is actually the core of everything. The governance of
each organization is diﬀerent because it is so situational, because it is so dependent on the
type of institution, the kind of people. . . (Healthcare Inspector)
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Although respondents recognize the importance of informal activities in order for
Boards of Directors, Supervisory Boards, and the Inspectorate to take up their role,
the fact that at the same time they are increasingly expected to account for their
actions to external parties makes it diﬃcult to perform and stand for such activities
in practice. It proves hard to give account of more relational and subjective aspects
of governance. As a consequence, there is an increasing disconnect between the
formalistic tools used in external regulation and the need for situated, informal
approaches. Although respondents recognize this to lead to ritualistic regulation, in
practice it is hard to overcome this as a result of the layered institutional arrange-
ment they are operating in.
We can conclude that although the discussion on governance in Dutch health-
care was meant to clarify the distribution of roles and responsibilities for the qual-
ity of care, this clarity is threatened by the layered context. In case of incidents, for
example, the state rushes in, thereby disturbing the market-based arrangement as
well as other state arrangements like the Inspectorate and the internal governance
of quality. The everyday getting by (Lawrence et al., 2011) with institutional layer-
ing, therefore also means struggling with layers. However, we have also seen exam-
ples where actors engage in institutional work by actively relating to the layered
context to overcome these problems, the subject we turn to next.
Responding to problems by relating to layers
Actors respond to the problems described above and to having to manage the
fragmented quality demands put on them by the market, state, and professional
community through institutional work, showing once again the interaction between
actors being inﬂuenced by their institutional context and their active engagement
with this context. They do this both in response to the problems caused by the
myriad demands from the external system and the nature of the instruments used
by external actors. We discuss them in turn.
A ﬁrst response to deal with the multitude of quality demands is simply to defy
them (Oliver, 1991). This strategy of refusing to comply with certain requests of the
Ministry (in case of the Inspectorate) or of other actors such as insurers (in case of
Boards of Directors) is sometimes used in practice.
Then in April or May we got this package of extra stuﬀ of Zorgverzekeraars
Nederland [association of healthcare insurers] and a week after that of the individual
insurers. Then you had to retrospectively provide information on last year which was just
a bit diﬀerent than what we had to provide the Inspectorate with. Then I asked to ﬁnd out
how much energy this would cost, I had to clear the schedule of two people for six weeks
for just one insurer (. . .). Then I refused. (respondent from association of healthcare
directors)
Other hospitals have a similar approach and argue that they have to make choices
about which rules and regulations to prioritize and which ones to ignore in order to
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be able to work on quality in a constructive way, thereby trying to gain control of
the quality agenda (Quartz et al., 2012).
They made an inventory about the number of guidelines, regulation etc. they had to
follow and they came to the number of 1400. His [director] proposition is that you
have to make a well-argued choice about where you focus your attention on, because
1400 subjects is a pointless exercise (. . .) that you pick ten themes and as Board of
Directors you decide to work on those. (healthcare Inspectorate)
The Inspectorate can also use a version of this defying strategy by strategically
using the layered structure in response to the multiple demands. An example of this
is pointing to the responsibility of insurers to close contracts with hospitals.
Insurers, as stated before, have an important role to play in the healthcare
market but are largely absent in the debate on quality. Some respondents point
out this absence and call on insurers to step up and take responsibility for the
quality of care. By pointing to the responsibilities of actors in the market, the
Inspectorate can deal with the pressure exerted on them by external parties, in
this case resisting pressure to use state arrangements to solve market failure.
Hospital boards and the Inspectorate also engage in institutional work in
response to the problems identiﬁed regarding the nature and focus of the quality
instruments that they are forced to use. They actively try to change these instru-
ments, a strategy earlier dubbed by Oliver (1991) as manipulation. For instance,
they try to gain control and prevent having to react to all kinds of outside ad hoc
pressure by building quality and supervision systems that allow them to deal with
quality more proactively. Moreover, these systems incorporate both formal and
informal aspects of governance work. This way these actors try to reshape and
(re)gain control over the governance of quality. Hospitals actively engage in dis-
cussions, in professional journals and elsewhere, to argue for a more strategic
approach to quality in which they can take the lead. The Inspectorate, recognizing
this call, developed a method to supervise the internal governance of hospitals
called system-based supervision in which they look at the hospitals’ integrated
prospective quality and safety systems and also walk around and talk to staﬀ
more informally in order to perform “reality checks.”
Then the only thing you have to explain in Parliament is that you have [insight in] the
system of the hospital. And that looked good and that also means that a hospital has a
prospective risk management system, of which as the Inspectorate you think it is trust-
worthy. (hospital director)
Part of this strategy of hospital directors and Inspectorate is to become active in the
quality debate and explain why the current way of doing things is not fruitful,
thereby trying to inﬂuence the layered institutional arrangement. This debate takes
place both internally in the hospital as well as externally. For instance, one director
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had to explain to the hospitals’ Supervisory Board that the request to eliminate all
risk is not an option; one can try to control them as much as possible but one has to
accept that risks will always be there. Explaining that in general quality of care is
high in the Netherlands and keeping one’s course is seen as part of this strategy to
steer the debate. Moreover, hospitals try to actively reshape the quality instruments
they are urged to use by other actors, such as indicators and safety programs, by
actively contributing to the development process of these instruments in consult-
ation processes with these other actors (Quartz et al., 2012; Van de Bovenkamp
et al., 2014). This way they are using the associational institutional arrangement to
inﬂuence market and state arrangements.
What these examples show is that this type of institutional work can be a way
for the actors involved to inﬂuence their position and the way they relate to the
institutional context. This working with layers through strategies of defying and
manipulation (Oliver, 1991) consists of trying to create manageable expectations,
shift responsibilities, and inﬂuence the layered institutional arrangement.
Conclusion
Institutional contexts in the public sector have become increasingly complex as they
are built on diﬀerent institutional arrangements that exist simultaneously (Streeck
and Thelen, 2005). We have shown that throughout the years the institutional
arrangement to steer Dutch healthcare quality has become layered with diﬀerent
institutional arrangements placed on top of or next to each other, forming a sediment-
like structure; self-regulation of professional communities, neo-corporatist consult-
ations in the associational order, state-based regulations and negotiations at the
healthcare market have been laid on top of each other and exist at the same time,
interacting with each other to diﬀerent eﬀects. While sometimes conﬂicting, these
institutional structures also are dependent on each other, e.g. the market could not
function without guidelines made in professional societies.
Institutional layering has important consequences for actors who have to relate
to an institutionally layered context. For example, they can be confronted with
institutional fragmentation (Van de Bovenkamp et al., 2014). Because of these
consequences it is important to gain more insight in how actors are inﬂuenced
by institutional layering. However, using the concept of institutional work
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) we showed that in turn actors’ responses to layering
can also cause further institutional change both within organizations and in their
institutional context. Whereas literature on layering mostly focuses on the macro
level and the literature on institutional work mostly focuses on the meso level,
combining the two concepts allowed us to gain a better understanding of the inter-
action between the two levels. More speciﬁcally, insight is gained into how layering
inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by institutional work.
This interaction between layering, shaping the activities of actors and actors
using and relating to layering in their institutional work is nicely shown in the
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governance and regulation of hospital quality as studied here. Our approach
allowed us to see that layering changes the activities of actors in the public
sector, can be used to strengthen one’s position but also presents actors with
new struggles, which they in turn can try to overcome by relating and using the
institutionally layered context. Layering and institutional work are therefore in
continuous interaction. For example, the introduction of a market-based system
with a focus on transparency urged Boards of Directors to increase their control
over quality of care, thereby creating the opportunity for these boards to
strengthen their position within the hospital and to get a stronger grip on their
healthcare professionals. Therefore, the institutional arrangement of the market
helped implement a structure that was in fact the result of an associational eﬀort
in creating quality policies. Moreover, the myriad of quality instruments that
have been invented and implemented are used by Boards of Directors,
Supervisory Boards, and the Inspectorate in their institutional work aimed at
gaining control of quality of care. This way, layering enabled these actors to
gain control and steer quality, albeit that dependency on other institutional
arrangements, like professional self-regulation, still stays in place. The layered
context also introduced problems such as having to relate to myriad actors and
instruments that shape activities in terms of what it means to be “in control” in a
speciﬁc way. The interplay of the layered institutional arrangements with their
emphasis on diﬀerent types of instruments and actor roles can thus also produce
dysfunctional eﬀects for quality of care. Again, we saw that actors respond to
these problems presented by layering through institutional work aimed at inﬂu-
encing their institutional context. Through this work, actors try to reshape the
governance of quality by inﬂuencing the institutional structures in which they
work and their relation to other actors within and outside their organizations
(Lawrence et al., 2011). Such institutional work is both strategic—as already
recognized within the public administration literature—but also involves the
day-to-day practice of getting things done.
The layering concept can enable our understanding of institutional change and
its consequences. One of the advantages of the concept is that it focuses on both
exogenous and endogenous sources of change, thereby acknowledging the
important role actors play in bringing about change but at the same time
acknowledging how their actions are inﬂuenced by the institutional context
(Hacker, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Van der Heijden, 2011). Besides
explaining institutional change, we feel that the layering concept can also help
to better understand complex institutional arrangements and how they inﬂuence
the activities of actors having to relate to such a context. The concept of insti-
tutional work helps to gain insight into how layering works out in practice fur-
ther by focusing on the actions of actors in relation to layering. Combining
institutional layering with a focus on the lived experiences of actors and their
institutional work makes it possible to move into the layered structure of public
governance and better understand the consequences of layering for, in our case,
healthcare practices.
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